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SHOULD A MATERIALIST BELIEVE IN QUALIA? 
David Lewis 
Should a materialist believe in qualia? Yes and no. 'Qualia' is a name for 
the occupants of a certain functional role that is spelled out in our tacitly 
known folk psychology. If materialism is true, there are no perfect occu-
pants of the role, and hence no perfect deservers of the name. But in all 
probability there are imperfect occupants of the role, imperfect deservers of 
the name. Good enough deservers of the name? May they just be called 
'qualia'? I say yes. 
But I take this to be a case of semantic indecision. There is no settled 
answer to the question 'how good is good enough?'. In part, maybe, it is a 
political question. The foe (or friend) of materialism who wants to make it 
out to be something radical and bizarre is entitled to say that materialist 
'qualia' are bogus, ersatz qualia; whereas a conservative materialist like me 
may say with equal right that qualia exist but are not quite as we take them 
to be.' 
'Qualia' isn't a term of ordinary language. Neither is 'phenomenal char-
acter' nor 'raw feel' nor 'subjective quality.' 'What it's like' or 'how it 
seems' are ordinary enough-but when used as terms for qualia, they are 
used in a special technical sense. You can say what it's like to taste New 
Zealand beer by saying what experience you have when you do, namely a 
sweet taste. But you can't say what it's like to have a sweet taste in the par-
allel way, namely by saying that when you do, you have a sweet taste! 
Yet despite the lack of folksy word or phrase, I still say that the concept 
of qualia is somehow built into folk psychology. My reason is that when 
philosophers tell us very concisely indeed what they mean by 'qualia', we 
catch on. I think they never say enough to introduce the concept from 
scratch to someone who doesn't already have it (whether or not he has the 
qualia themselves). But maybe they do say enough to serve as a reminder 
to someone who has the concept already, even if he has it in some inexplic-
it way. 
Now I will say what I think the folk-psychological concept-and hence 
the definitive role-of qualia is. 
Preliminaries: I will say experiences when I mean particular events of 
experiencing. These events are havings of experiential states, which are had 
repeatedly at different times and by different people. These repeatable 
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states are also called' experiences' -but not in this paper. An experience is 
of the same type as another if it is the having of exactly the same experien-
tial state. An experience is novel if the subject hasn't had an experience of 
the same type before. 
It is well known that by having novel experiences we gain mental abili-
ties, often abilities we can gain in no other way. These include the ability to 
recognize experiences of the same type when they come again, and also the 
ability to imagine experiences of that type when not having them. 
Experiences of different types confer different such abilities.2 Presumably it 
is because of properties they have that experiences confer these abilities; 
and experiences of different types must differ in their ability-conferring 
properties. A concept of qualia-a materialistically acceptable concept, but 
perhaps not the whole of the folk concept-is the concept of properties of 
experiences apt for causing abilities to recognize and to imagine experi-
ences of the same type. 
Maybe there is more to the concept than that, even before we get to the 
part I think is trouble. Maybe, for instance, it is part of the concept that the 
qualia of experiences are responsible for responses of pleasure, disgust, etc. 
And maybe it its part of the concept that the qualia of experiences are 
responsible for judgements of similarity-distance, e.g. the judgement that 
these two colour-samples nearly match whereas those two contrast strik-
ingly; and in this way, the qualia of experiences constitute something akin 
to a metric space. 
It may well be redundant to speak of both experiential states and of 
qualia. If E, E ... are various experiential states, then being a having of E, 
being a having of F, ... are corresponding properties of particular experi-
ences. Might it just be these properties that occupy the functional role of 
qualia (insofar as the role described so far is rightly so-called)? If so, no 
harm. Then these properties corresponding to experiential states are candi-
dates-the best candidates around, in my view-to deserve the name of 
qualia. So if the state pain is C-firing, to take a toy example, then the dis-
tinctive quale of pains would be the property: being an event of C-firing. 
Unfortunately there is more to the folk-psychological concept of qualia 
than I have yet said. It concerns the modus operandi of qualia. Folk psychol-
ogy says, I think, that we identify the qualia of our experiences. We know 
exactly what they are-and that in an uncommonly demanding and literal 
sense of 'knowing what'.lf I have an experience with quale Q, I know that 
I am having an experience with quale Q, and I will afterwards remember 
(unless I happen to forget) that on that occasion 1 had an experience with 
quale Q. It is by producing this identifying knowledge that a novel experi-
ence confers abilities to recognize and imagine. Recognition: when Fred 
first tasted Vegemite, he found out that it caused an experience with quale 
Q. Afterwards, when he has an experience that has quale Q, he knows he is 
having an experience that has quale Q, so he infers that he is having an 
experience of the same type as before; and so he may at least guess that he 
is again tasting Vegemite. Imagination: Fred knew all along, supposedly, 
how to imagine an experience having quale Q. But only when he had tast-
ed Vegemite did he know that by imagining an experience with quale Q, 
he would be imagining an experience of tasting Vegemite. 
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Call this the Identification Thesis. Why do I think it must be part of the 
folk theory of qualia? Because so many philosophers find it so very obvi-
ous.3 I think it seems obvious because it is built into folk psychology. 
Others will think it gets built into folk psychology because it is so obvious; 
but either way, the obviousness and the folk-psychological status go 
together. 
I spoke of 'an uncommonly demanding and literal sense of "knowing 
what'''. Let me elaborate. I say that according to the Identification Thesis, 
the knowledge I gain by having an experience with quale Q enables me to 
know what Q is-identifies Q-in this sense: any possibility not ruled out 
by the content of my knowledge is one in which it is Q, and not any other 
property instead, that is the quale of my experience. Equivalently, when I 
have an experience with quale Q, the knowledge I thereby gain reveals the 
essence of Q: a property of Q such that, necessarily, Q has it and nothing 
else does. If, for instance, Q is essentially the physical property of being an 
event of C-firing, and if I identify the qualia of my experience in the appro-
priate 'demanding and literal' sense, I come to know that what is going on 
in me is an event of C-firing. Contrapositively: if I identify the quale of my 
experience in the appropriate sense, and yet know nothing of the firing of 
my neurons, then the quale of my experience cannot have been essentially 
the property of being an event of C-firing. 
A materialist cannot accept the Identification Thesis. If qualia are physi-
cal properties of experiences, and experiences in tum are physical events, 
then it is certain that we seldom, if ever, identify the qualia of our experi-
ences. Making discoveries in neurophysiology is not so easy!4 So if the 
Identification Thesis is indeed built into folk psychology, then those physi-
cal properties are imperfect occupants of the definitive role of qualia, and 
imperfect occupants of the definitive folk-psychological role of qualia, and 
imperfect deservers of the name. They may yet deserve the name well 
enough. 
Should a materialist believe in qualia? Yes: he should believe in imper-
fect but good-enough deservers of the name, occupants of the part of the 
folk-psychological role we get by leaving out the Identification Thesis. And 
no: he should not believe in perfect deservers of the name, occupants of the 
entire role. It is not altogether wrong to call him an 'eliminativist'. But see 
how little he eliminates, how much he retains. 
To conclude, I distinguish the Identification Thesis itself from two harm-
less look-alikes. A materialist can and should accept these look-alike the-
ses. That makes his position seem less radical; it softens the blow of reject-
ing the Identification Thesis in its full-strength, materialistically unaccept-
able form. 
First, there is no reason to deny that the broad, de re content of my 
knowledge does, in the strongest sense, identify the qualia. Hitherto, I have 
been denying that the narrow de se and de dicto content of my knowledge 
identifies the qualia. But broad content is constituted partly by my narrow 
de se self-ascriptions involving acquaintance, partly by the identity of the 
objects of acquaintance. Thus I may know de re of Fred that he is a burglar, 
but without in any sense identifying Fred.s Likewise I may know de re of a 
certain physical property that it is among the qualia of my present ex peri-
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ence, but without identifying the property in question. 
Second, there is no reason to deny that we know what the qualia of our 
experiences are in a not-so-demanding, not-so-literal, everyday sense of 
'knowing what'. Suppose that the essence of a chemical element is its 
atomic number. I have forgotten the atomic number of potassium. So in the 
demanding sense, I no longer know exactly which element potassium is. 
Yet I still know what it is in the sense that I have a rich cluster of descrip-
tions of potassium. These include egocentric descriptions in terms of the 
relations of acquaintance, linguistic and otherwise, that I bear to potassi-
um. By some everyday standards, that counts as knowing what potassium 
is. Likewise, 'individuating by acquaintance', I know who various people 
are even though I do not know their essences-anyway, not under any 
plausible version of essentialism I can think of.? And likewise, though I 
don't know the essences of the various qualia of my experiences, I do 
know what relations of acquaintance I bear to these qualia. So in some not-
so-demanding everyday sense I know what these qualia are, even if the 
full-strength Identification Thesis is false.s 
Princeton University 
NOTES 
*Reprinted from the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(1995) pp. 140-144, 
with the editor's permission. 
1. This is a reply, inter alia, to Robert M. Adams, 'Flavors, Colors, and 
Cod', in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 243-262. Adams argues that 'it is a theoreti-
cal advantage of theism that it makes possible a [theological] explanation' of 
the correlation of qualia and physical states (p. 250). In his final section, Adams 
notes that according to materialism there is no such correlation to be explained; 
but this, he says, is because the materialist is committed to a 'radical' and 'des-
perate' eliminativism about qualia. I disagree. 
2. See Laurence Nemirow, 'Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of 
Acquaintance', and David Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches', both in William 
G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) pp. 490-
519. 
3. Adams, for instance, speaks of our 'first-person' wy of identifying 
qualia (op. cit., p.259). And Saul Kripke seems to be relying on the Identification 
Thesis in Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) p. 152, when he writes 
that 'pain .. .is picked out by its immediate phenomenological quality ... ' and 
concludes that 'pain' can be a rigid designator although it is not introduced by 
rigidifying any accidental description of pain. 
4. If we know exactly what the qualia of our experiences are, they can 
have no essential hidden structure-no 'grain' -of which we remain ignorant. 
(If we didn't know whether their hidden 'grain' ran this way or that, we 
wouldn't know exactly what they were. Whatever we might know about them, 
we would not fully know their essence.) But if nothing essential about the 
qualia is hidden, then if they seem simple, they are simple. We may assume 
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that if a property is structural, then it is so essentially. Then it is a consequence 
of the Identification Thesis that if we fail to notice structure, there is no struc-
ture there to notice. But we do fail to notice structure. So the simplicity of the 
qualia is a consequence of the Identification Thesis (inter alia), and so a deriva-
tive part of the folk-psychological concept of qualia. Here is another part of 
that concept that a materialist should disown. 
The simplicity of the qualia is a premise of Adams' argument that we can-
not hope to explain the correlation of qualia and physical states within a future 
science of dualistic psychophysics (op. cit., p.253). 
5. I self-ascribe the property: staring at a burglar; I am in fact staring at 
Fred, though neither in the demanding sense nor in any everyday sense do I 
know who I am staring at. That is how I believe (and maybe also know) de rc of 
Fred that he is a burglar. See David Lewis, 'Attitudes Dc Dicto and De Se', The 
Philosophical Review 88 (1979) pp. 513-543, esp. 538-543. 
6. See Jaakko Hintikka, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance-Individuation by 
Acquaintance' in D.F. Pears (ed.), Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972); and David Lewis, 'Individuation by 
Acquaintance and by Stipulation', The Philosophical Review 92(983) pp. 3-32. 
7. The case of identifying a person (or a thing) is unlike the case of identi-
fying potassium, or identifying a quale. But how to describe the difference is a 
controversial question in the metaphysics of modality. Potassium is spread 
over many possible worlds; there is a clear candidate-atomic number-for 
being its essence; and this essence can be known. Likewise for qualia, at least if 
they are indeed physical properties such as the property of being an event of 
C-firing. On my own view people are strictly speaking confined to single 
worlds, though they have other-worldly counterparts; their essences consist of 
properties they share with their counterparts; the counterpart relation suffers 
from semantic indecision, and so likewise does the line between essential and 
accidental descriptions; essences are knowable insofar as they are determinate, 
but the line between knowing someone's essence and simply being well-
informed about him (which is the line between identifying him in the 
'demanding' and in the 'not-so-demanding' sense) disappears. On another 
view, someone's essence is a non-qualitative haecceity; that essence never can 
be known. So the only useful sense of identification is the 'not-so-demanding' 
sense. On yet another view, the essence of a person is the property of originat-
ing from a certain sperm and egg; you might hope to know who someone 
essentially is at least if you are the technician who presides over the in vitro 
conception of a test-tube baby; but no, you only swap the problem of knowing 
the person's essence for the problem of knowing the essence of the sperm and 
egg seen under your microscope. You gain nothing. Again, the only useful 
sense of identification is the 'not-so-demanding' sense. 
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